北京:扩大残疾儿童学前教育康复学位

字体 -

记者近日从北京市特殊教育提升计划工作部署会上获悉,北京市教委、市发展改革委等八部门日前联合印发《北京市特殊教育提升计划(2017—2020年)》,确定到2020年,北京将实现学前三年基本教育康复服务覆盖全市所有3—6岁残疾儿童。全港首個相關的全日制公開大學 學位課程,專門教授電子、物理機械及化學微生物三大範疇的檢測認證知識。為切合行業的需要,課程特意在今年初落成的公大銀禧學院10樓全層,設立多間配備先進、參照國際標準運作的實驗室,部分設施更是本港少有供給大學本科學生的培訓場地。

《提升计划》明确,面向学前残疾儿童,北京将全面开展学前三年基本教育康复服务。通过扩大残疾儿童学前教育康复学位,包括特教学校附设幼儿园或增加学前部。同时,每个学区至少要有1—2所幼儿园拿出部分学位接收残疾儿童。义务教育阶段,对符合入学条件的残疾儿童少年,北京将按照“就近就便”原则优先安置。全港首個相關的全日制公開大學 課程,專門教授電子、物理機械及化學微生物三大範疇的檢測認證知識。為切合行業的需要,課程特意在今年初落成的公大銀禧學院10樓全層,設立多間配備先進、參照國際標準運作的實驗室,部分設施更是本港少有供給大學本科學生的培訓場地。

高中阶段,北京将采取“就近适宜”“安置入学”方式普及残疾学生高中阶段教育。

此外,北京加大了直接惠及残疾学生的投入力度,扩大特殊教育学校、普通中小学残疾学生生均公用经费列支范围,对学前至高中阶段的残疾儿童少年在“三免两补”的基础上增加伙食费、特殊学习用品费、校服费等补助。全港首個相關的全日制公開大學 課程,專門教授電子、物理機械及化學微生物三大範疇的檢測認證知識。為切合行業的需要,課程特意在今年初落成的公大銀禧學院10樓全層,設立多間配備先進、參照國際標準運作的實驗室,部分設施更是本港少有供給大學本科學生的培訓場地。

分享博文至:

    2 条评论

  1. 1
    Aasir - 2018年3月25日 00:43

    On March 12, fresh off his Twitter proclamation that “trade wars are good and easy to win,” President Trump issued an executive order blocking the biggest tech merger in history. The plan had been for Broadcom Ltd., a Singaporean chipmaker, to acquire San Diego’s Qualcomm Inc., the leading maker of cellphone modems, for $117 billion. Trump said he canceled the deal for fear that Broadcom “might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the U.S.”

    The move deflated even the characteristically fiery Hock Tan, Broadcom’s chief executive officer. Trump had praised Tan at the White House months earlier. Moreover, Broadcom looks in most respects like an American company. Tan is a U.S. citizen and resident, the company’s employees are mostly in California, the deal was underwritten by American private equity firms, and Broadcom had promised to relocate its headquarters back to California as part of the deal. What more could American national security interests want? Almost immediately, however, the conversation shifted from Broadcom to Washington’s real concern: Huawei.

    Huawei Technologies Co. is China’s biggest tech company by revenue, with sales 60 percent greater than those of the runner-up, JD.com Inc. Huawei is one of the world’s biggest producers of telecommunications networking equipment, despite a de facto ban that prevents America’s four principal wireless carriers—AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and Sprint—from using its gear. The company also makes an ever-growing share of the world’s smartphones. These two factors have rendered it terrifying enough to many American policymakers that they’re willing to leave Broadcom the loser in a bigger game.

    Chuck Grassley of Iowa, one of the longest-serving Senate Republicans, says he’s worried about the prospect of American telecommunications companies becoming dependent on a Chinese manufacturer whose motives he finds suspect. “I can’t pronounce their name,” Grassley says, “but it starts with an H and ends with a W-E-I. Whenever they’re involved, it scares the devil out of me.”

    This fear, which Trump’s executive order did little to soothe, stems partly from Huawei’s wild success. Besides growing faster than Apple Inc.and Samsung Electronics Co., the only phone makers with more global market share, the company now has the production capacity and technical know-how to rival Qualcomm in the race to develop the fifth generation of wireless equipment, which promises to make possible superfast smartphone data connections, self-driving cars, and remote-controlled medical devices and industrial equipment.

    A Huawei with greater sway over the 5G market could stand to sap billions of dollars from U.S. rivals and charge other companies pricey fees on any patents it enjoys. But hawks such as Grassley say the bigger problem is security—that the Chinese government could slip through backdoors into Huawei’s networking hardware and software, enabling it to spy on Americans’ phone calls, texts, and emails.

    Trump’s case against Broadcom’s acquisition of Qualcomm rested on a peculiar bankshot between these two points. The White House argued that Tan, who tends to slash expenses wherever he goes, would likely cut Qualcomm’s spending on research and development, indirectly giving Huawei a greater advantage in the race to develop 5G wireless standards and equipment. In a letter dated March 5, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, warned that the potential deal would lead to “a weakening of Qualcomm’s position,” leaving “an opening for China to expand its influence on the 5G standard-setting process.” Because, the letter continued, of the “well-known U.S. national security concerns about Huawei and other Chinese telecommunications companies, a shift to Chinese dominance would have substantial negative national security consequences.”

    In early January, Mike Conaway, a Texas Republican, introduced a House bill that would ban the federal government from doing business with any entity that relies on Huawei equipment. Two weeks later, a leaked U.S. National Security Council draft memo on 5G networks described the progress of Chinese technology companies as a threat to American security. The memo mentioned two by name: Huawei and the smaller ZTE Corp. It called for the government to make a national 5G network an investment akin to President Eisenhower’s interstate highway system.

    Huawei dismisses American fears about its intentions as nationalistic fearmongering. It says it has no more connection to the Chinese government than Apple or Google and that installing backdoors for spies in its network hardware or software would be tantamount to market suicide. “We’re 30 years in this business, and there hasn’t been a single security issue,” says Joe Kelly, the company’s vice president for international media affairs. “Should America have anything to fear from us from a cybersecurity perspective? The answer is no.”

    The NSC memo damaged Huawei, even though the carriers initially laughed it off and the U.S. Federal Communications Commissiondisavowed it. Within a day, Verizon Communications Inc. reversed a plan to sell Huawei’s phones in its stores. AT&T Inc. had already abandoned a similar partnership under pressure from Congress.

    Two people familiar with the memo’s creation say the White House is worried that U.S. wireless carriers lack the financial muscle to build four separate networks and that China will beat the U.S. to deploying the new technology unless Washington takes drastic action. In this context, the Broadcom deal’s scuttling stands as an escalation of hostilities between the two countries that some have compared to the beginning of the Cold War. “This is a major concern,” says a senior U.S. telecom executive involved in 5G policy discussions. “This is the new battleground, not F-35 fighters.”

    It’s tough to see this conflict happening from inside the U.S., where the only mainstream phones are Apple’s and Samsung’s and existing networks are plenty fast for regular Facebooking. In China, the U.S. government’s moves are considered the latest in a string of outrages. In the days following the killing of the Broadcom deal, a hashtag that translated roughly as “Huawei banned in the U.S.” appeared tens of thousands of times on Weibo, China’s equivalent of Twitter. And on Feb. 1, the WeChat account of the People’s Daily, the official Communist Party news outlet, published a post decrying American protectionism. “The robust rise of Huawei and the robust rise of China and the Chinese internet tech companies may have left the U.S. worried,” the paper wrote. The post was later removed.

    Of course, it’s not easy these days to permanently hobble Huawei, which has grown into one of China’s so-called national champions with the aid, critics say, of government contracts and near-unlimited lines of credit. The company has 180,000 employees, most of them engineers, and sells its products in 170 countries. Though it’s privately held, Huawei reports earnings twice a year as part of a larger transparency effort designed to persuade foreign governments to contract with the company. It says it booked about $92 billion in revenue in 2017, up from $35 billion just five years earlier, and aims to top 12 figures in 2018.

    And Huawei has lots of room to grow, especially if it takes a strong hand in developing 5G standards. The March CFIUS letter noted that Huawei has about 10 percent of the 5G patents so far, and the company says it has 300 of its best engineers working full time to develop more, with help from thousands of others. Huawei says it’s spent $600 million on 5G research and expects to lay out an additional $800 million this year to bring the technology to market. It already has about 50 contracts with wireless carriers to test its equipment. Overall, it spent about $12 billion on R&D in 2016, compared with $5.1 billion for Qualcomm and $4.9 billion for Finland’s Nokia Corp.

    Huawei’s headquarters, a sprawling, serene campus with low office buildings, a dozen cafeterias, and immaculately landscaped palm and banyan trees, would fit nicely in Silicon Valley. The one obvious flourish: a large man-made lake inhabited by a flock of black swans, which reclusive founder Ren Zhengfei is said to have imported from Europe as symbols of Huawei’s uniqueness. There are other idiosyncrasies. Until recently, the company was run by a trio of CEOs who served rotating six-month terms, and it may be the world’s largest business that’s structured as an employee stock ownership plan.

    More familiar is the role of Ren, who grew up in a poor part of Southwest China. He owns a mere 1 percent stake but has veto power over major decisions, and his companywide emails betray his past as an engineer in the People’s Liberation Army. A 2017 memo urged employees to adopt 21 distinct “military disciplines,” axioms such as: “Company secrets are always sold along with your soul.”

    Ren has also rigidly enforced the company lore. The official story goes like this: In 1983, he lost his army job, a casualty of nascent privatization efforts, and wound up working at a small, state-owned oil company in the future tech hub of Shenzhen. While he struggled to get by on his government salary, he learned about business and became interested in the idea that China might one day manufacture its own technology equipment. So he was more or less ready in 1987, when Shenzhen, designated a “special economic zone” years earlier as part of Beijing’s gradual embrace of private enterprise, began allowing entrepreneurs to start tech companies.

    Ren quickly started Huawei with roughly $3,000 in capital from five investors and no obvious plan. “It was not as romantic as you imagined,” he recalled in an interview at the annual World Economic Forum in 2015. “Neither was it so wonderful.” In its early years, Huawei imported equipment from Hong Kong and sold it on the mainland, but before long Ren’s engineers were developing their own crude, fridge-size switches for phone networks, the first items in what would become a massive catalog of computing and networking hardware.

    In 2001, once it had become a cheaper alternative to American networking leader Cisco Systems Inc. in its home market, Huawei made landfall in the U.S., setting up 30 employees in a 24,000-square-foot facility in Plano, Texas. By the company’s account, it was a humble operation: Workers had trouble with the language and didn’t sign up a single American customer for more than three years. Support from the Chinese government, however, allowed it to spend heavily on R&D (including developing its own mobile chips) and to undercut competitors. “It was lower interest rates, deferred payments, don’t pay anything now,” recalls Anthony Lacavera, the CEO of Canadian wireless carrier Wind Mobile, which bought Huawei gear in 2009. “It felt like a retail promotion.”

    Lacavera, like many customers, initially saw Huawei as a lower-end supplier. His impression changed partway through the negotiating process, when he visited its jumbo R&D lab in Shanghai’s Pudong district. Sales reps led Lacavera through a conventional product presentation, but the real showstopper was the office tour. “It was rows of desks as far as you could see,” he says. “It was a scale that I’d never seen before. They were there to compete.” As China has grown into the world’s largest semiconductor market, Huawei has grown along with it. Unlike most rivals, the company makes its own chips, cutting out Qualcomm.

    Advertisement

    Huawei’s is one of the great success stories of modern China, but the tale can feel strangely incomplete. While Ren’s official biography notes that in 1982 he attended the Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress, the twice-a-decade meeting of the country’s ruling elite, that honor seems hard to square with the fact that he was laid off a year later. A scathing Obama-era congressional investigation, prompted by Huawei’s failed attempts to acquire American tech companies, alleged that Ren might have been a high-ranking Chinese spymaster and indeed may still be. The House report also included claims that Huawei’s chairwoman, Sun Yafang, had worked for the Ministry of State Security. Huawei denies these allegations. (Shortly after this story was first published, Huawei announced that Sun was stepping down as chairwoman and that Ren would become CEO.)

    The company has also been repeatedly accused of more corporate-variety espionage. In 2003, Cisco sued Huawei, saying it had discovered its own source code, bugs and all, inside Huawei software. The Chinese company eventually conceded that a small portion of its router software had been copied from Cisco, but said the act had been inadvertent. In the end, the companies settled, with Cisco dropping its suit and Huawei tweaking its products.

    In 2009, when Canadian networking giant Nortel declared bankruptcy, employees blamed a hack that they traced to China, one that for almost a decade had granted the attackers access to the CEO’s emails and other company files. China denied any involvement, but Brian Shields, the security engineer who first noticed the hack, told the CBC that Huawei had been the intended beneficiary. “How can you survive when you have a competitor basically right there, knowing all your moves?” he asked.

    Most U.S. allies still allow Huawei products into their wireless networks but scrutinize them for possible security vulnerabilities. In 2010, as part of a compromise with the U.K., Huawei opened what it calls its Cyber Security Evaluation Centre in Banbury, in Southern England. The office, more commonly known as the Cell, is staffed by Huawei employees but supervised by British intelligence officers, who examine the company’s code for possible backdoors. The local officers have reported no security flaws, and Huawei has traded on that record to expand its operations throughout Western Europe.

    The problem with the Cell, at least from the U.S. point of view, is that it’s really hard to find a security hole unless you know exactly where to find it. A modern wireless switch might have millions of lines of code, and things can slip through in preproduction or be added on the factory floor or in a routine update. Hardware vulnerabilities, like the ones revealed in Intel chips earlier this year after more than a decade, can be almost impossible to anticipate or spot. In a nightmare scenario, a backdoor could be hard-coded into the silicon on a Huawei chip, then activated remotely, potentially opening with a few keystrokes the contents of an entire network to the Chinese military.

    One reason American policymakers are so mindful of this sort of scenario is that U.S. intelligence agencies have routinely exploited domestic companies for exactly the same purpose. AT&T so freely aided National Security Agency eavesdropping that the agency praised it for an “extreme willingness to help” in a document leaked by former contractor Edward Snowden and published by the New York Times. Suspicions of Huawei’s ties to the Chinese government appear in the leaked Snowden files, but so do frustrations that Huawei encryption was too good for U.S. spies to crack. “The irony,” a Huawei executive said at the time, “is that exactly what they are doing to us is what they have always charged that the Chinese are doing through us.”

    Silicon Valley’s roots, like those of the internet itself, lie in technologies developed by or for the Pentagon. So China’s blackout of Google and its temporary removal of Apple from a list of approved government suppliers make a certain amount of sense. A reckoning has been a long time coming, says James Lewis, a former U.S. State Department cybersecurity expert now affiliated with the Center for Strategic & International Studies, a Washington think tank. “China is deeply worried about this, and they have been for more than a decade,” he says. “Their solution was, ‘We’ll build our own national champions.’ That’s kind of the genesis of Huawei.”

    Yet if the U.S. and China continue to escalate the stonewalling of one another’s tech companies, they could slow the progress of innovation worldwide. Lewis thinks the U.S. has three options, none of them particularly good. Two are political suicide in America: Throwing vast sums of public money behind national champions to battle China’s or subsidizing the only non-Chinese companies that can compete for big equipment contracts—Sweden’s Ericsson AB and Finland’s Nokia.

    The third option is less realistic. Government researchers have been working for at least 15 years on a kind of unbreakable encryption meant to secure hardware that can’t otherwise be trusted. It’s not clear that’s even possible. “I saw one of the people involved in the last couple of weeks, and I said, how’s that going?” Lewis says. “They haven’t been able to make it work.”

    —With Yuan Gao and Alistair Barr

    Read the origianal article here

  2. 2
    Aasir - 2018年3月25日 00:51

    为什么美国害怕中国最大的科技公司? 3月12日,特朗普总统发布了一项行政命令,阻止了历史上最大的科技合并,他新推出的Twitter宣言“贸易战争很好并且很容易赢得胜利”。该计划是为新加坡芯片制造商Broadcom Ltd.以1170亿美元收购圣迭戈的手机调制解调器领先制造商高通公司。特朗普称他取消了这笔交易,因为担心博通“可能会采取可能损害美国国家安全的行动”

    这一举措令Broadcom首席执行官即使是火热的Hock Tan也感到沮丧。几个月前,特朗普曾在白宫赞扬谭。而且,Broadcom在很多方面都看起来像一家美国公司。 Tan是美国公民和居民,该公司的员工大部分在加利福尼亚州,交易由美国私人股权公司承保,Broadcom已承诺将其总部迁回加利福尼亚,作为交易的一部分。美国国家安全利益还需要什么?然而,几乎立刻,谈话就从Broadcom转移到了华盛顿真正关心的问题上:华为。

    华为技术有限公司是按收入计算的中国最大的科技公司,其销售额超过亚军JD.com公司的60%。华为是全球最大的电信网络设备制造商之一,尽管事实上的禁令阻止了美国的四大主要无线运营商AT&T,Verizon,T-Mobile和Sprint使用其设备。该公司还在全球智能手机市场中占有越来越大的份额。这两个因素使得许多美国决策者感到害怕,他们愿意让Broadcom成为更大游戏中的失败者。

    美国参议院共和党参议院中服役时间最长的美国爱荷华州州长Chuck Grassley表示,他担心美国电信公司会依赖中国制造商的前景,而中国制造商的动机是他所怀疑的。 “我不能说出他们的名字,”格拉斯利说,“但是它以H开头,结束于W-E-I。每当他们卷入其中,它都会吓倒我的魔鬼。“

    这种恐惧,特朗普的行政命令没有什么安抚作用,部分源于华为的巨大成功。除了苹果公司和三星电子公司这三家唯一拥有更多全球市场份额的手机制造商的增长速度之外,该公司现在拥​​有与Qualcomm竞争开发第五代无线设备的生产能力和技术诀窍,它有望实现超快速的智能手机数据连接,自动驾驶汽车,遥控医疗设备和工业设备。 华为在5G市场上的影响力可能会从美国竞争对手那里花费数十亿美元,并向其他公司收取任何它享有的专利的高昂费用。但是,像Grassley这样的鹰派则认为更大的问题是安全问题 - 中国政府可以通过后门进入华为的网络硬件和软件,使其能够窥探美国人的电话,短信和电子邮件。

    特朗普针对Broadcom收购Qualcomm的案件依赖于这两点之间的特殊银行账户。白宫认为,无论他去哪里都倾向于大幅削减开支的Tan可能会削减高通在研发方面的开支,间接地给华为在开发5G无线标准和设备方面带来更大的优势。美国外国投资委员会(CFIUS)在3月5日的一封信中警告说,这项潜在的交易可能会导致“高通公司的地位下降”,而“中国的开放空间将扩大其对5G标准的影响力“因为,这封信继续说道,”美国国家安全部门担心华为和其他中国电信公司的知名度,转向中国的主导地位会对国家安全造成严重的负面影响。“

    1月初,德克萨斯州共和党人Mike Conaway推出了一项房屋法案,禁止联邦政府与任何依赖华为设备的实体进行业务往来。两周后,泄露的美国国家安全委员会关于5G网络的备忘录草案描述了中国科技公司对美国安全构成威胁的进展。备忘录中提到了两个名称:华为和中小型企业。它呼吁政府建立一个国家5G网络,这个投资类似于艾森豪威尔州际公路系统。

    华为否认美国人担心其作为民族主义恐惧行为的意图。它说它与中国政府没有比苹果或谷歌更多的联系,并且在其网络硬件或软件中安装间谍后门将无异于自杀。该公司负责国际媒体事务的副总裁Joe Kelly说:“我们在这个行业已经有30年了,而且还没有一个安全问题。 “从网络安全的角度来看,美国是否应该有什么可怕的?答案是不。”

    NSC的备忘录损害了华为,尽管运营商最初嘲笑它并且美国联邦通信委员会拒绝了它。在一天之内,Verizon通信公司推翻了在其商店销售华为手机的计划。美国电话电报公司已经在国会的压力下放弃了类似的合作关系。 熟悉备忘录创作的两位人士表示,白宫担心美国无线运营商缺乏建立四个独立网络的财政能力,除非华盛顿采取大刀阔斧的行动,否则中国将击败美国来部署这项新技术。在这种情况下,Broadcom协议的破裂是两国之间敌对行动的升级,有些与冷战初期相比。一位参与5G政策讨论的美国高级电信高管表示:“这是一个主要问题。 “这是新的战场,而不是F-35战机。”

    很难看到这种冲突发生在美国境内,其中唯一的主流手机是苹果和三星,而现有的网络对于经常的Facebook来说足够快。在中国,美国政府的举动被认为是一连串暴行中的最新举动。在Broadcom交易被扼杀之后的几天里,大致翻译成“华为被美国禁止”的标签在微博上出现了数万次,中国相当于Twitter。 2月1日,中共官方新闻媒体“人民日报”的微信账号发表了一篇谴责美国保护主义的文章。报告写道:“华为的强劲增长以及中国和中国互联网科技公司的强劲崛起可能让美国感到担忧。该帖子后来被删除。

    当然,现在不容易的是,华为已经成长为中国所谓的全国冠军之一,华尔街日报的评论家们认为,政府合同和近乎无限的信用额度已经成为中国的一员。该公司拥有18万名员工,其中大部分是工程师,并在170个国家销售其产品。虽然它是私人持股,但华为每年两次公布收益,作为旨在说服外国政府与该公司签约的更大透明度努力的一部分。它表示,它预计2017年收入约为920亿美元,高于五年前的350亿美元,并计划在2018年达到12位数字。 华为有很大的发展空间,特别是如果它在开发5G标准方面需要强有力的支持。美国证券交易委员会3月份的一封信指出,华为目前拥有5G专利的10%左右,该公司表示,在其他数千人的帮助下,该公司拥有300名最优秀的工程师全职开发更多产品。华为表示,它已花费6亿美元进行5G研究,预计今年还将额外投入8亿美元,将技术推向市场。它已经与无线运营商签署了约50份合同来测试其设备。总体而言,2016年其研发投入约为120亿美元,高通为51亿美元,芬兰诺基亚为49亿美元。

    华为总部是一座宽阔宁静的校园,办公楼很低,有十几个自助餐厅,棕榈树和榕树的景色十分美丽,非常适合硅谷。一个显而易见的繁荣:一个人口稠密的大型湖泊,栖息着一群黑天鹅,据说隐遁的任正非创始人任正非从欧洲引进来作为华为独特的象征。还有其他的特质。直到最近,该公司还是由三名首席执行官负责管理,这些首席执行官的任期为六个月,并且可能是全球最大的企业,其结构为员工持股计划。

    Ren在中国西南贫困地区长大的角色更为人熟知。他仅拥有1%的股份,但对重大决策拥有否决权,他的全公司电子邮件背叛了他作为解放军工程师的过去。 2017年备忘录敦促员工采用21种不同的“军事纪律”,公理如:“公司机密总是随着你的灵魂一起销售”。

    Ren也严格执行公司传闻。官方的故事是这样的:1983年,他失去了军队工作,成为新兴私有化努力的牺牲品,并在深圳未来的科技中心的一家小型国有石油公司工作。当他努力争取政府薪水时,他了解到了业务,并对中国可能有一天会制造自己的技术设备感到兴趣。所以他在1987年或多或少已经准备好了,那时多年前深圳作为北京逐渐拥抱私人企业的一部分被指定为“经济特区”,开始允许企业家创办科技公司。

    Ren从五位投资者那里以约3,000美元的资本快速启动了华为,并没有明显的计划。 “这并不像你想象的那么浪漫,”他在2015年的世界经济论坛年会上接受采访时回忆说,“它们也不是那么美妙。”华为早年从香港进口设备并在大陆销售,但不久之后,任先生的工程师们正在开发自己的电话网络原汁原味的冰箱尺寸开关,这是第一批将成为大量计算和网络硬件的产品。

发表评论